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MANAGING THE INTERNALISATION PROCESS 
– A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Internalisation theory informs us about why and when multinational enterprises (MNEs) internalise 
foreign operations, but has less to say about how the internalisation should be prepared and 
exercised when foreign market operations initially are carried out by local, outside agents. Drawing 
on insights from managerially-oriented literature, this paper explores the role of management in 
situations where the market transaction costs of using outside agents are negligible at market entry, 
but grow over time. A key question pertaining to this situation is: what management instruments 
may ensure persistent concurrence between changing pressure for internalisation in a foreign market 
and the effectuated internalisation of an MNE in that market? Management instruments and 
strategies that potentially support ‘staged internalisation’ include appropriation of the local outside 
agent’s financial assets (including equity) as well as non-financial assets in relation to user rights, 
customer relations, and value added activities. 
 
JEL CODES: F23, L22, M21 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Internalisation theory has been has been one of the most important and influential theories within 
the field of international business (Buckley/Casson 1976, Hennart 1982, McManus 1972, 
Rugman 1981). It has been used to explain the circumstances under which a firm replaces 
imperfect (or non-existent) external markets by internal coordination (Buckley 1993). Together 
with market power explanations (Hymer 1960/1976, Yamin 1994) and knowledge-based 
explanations (Grant 1996, Kogut/Zander 1993), internalisation theory offers a paradigm able to 
explain - with a high degree of accuracy under certain assumed conditions - why multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) choose to exercise daily managerial control over foreign operations rather 
than work through other firms under contractual or other arrangements. Hence, on a general level 
internalisation theory can explain the existence of MNEs. By including time-responsive factors 
that pull in the direction of internalisation the theory can also predict patterns and directions of 
growth of MNEs. However, the theory excludes any meaningful role for management, 
particularly in the real world dynamic context of constantly evolving foreign market conditions 
and operations of a MNE (Buckley 1993).  
 Therefore, in this article we seek to develop internalisation theory by including 
managerial judgement considerations in the context of dynamic influences on the development of 
foreign operations. We introduce the managerial role by eliciting best management practices in 
situations where the market transaction costs of using outside agents (local operators) are 
negligible at market entry, but grow over time. A key question pertaining to this situation is: what 
management instruments may ensure persistent concurrence between a changing pressure for 
internalisation in a foreign market and the effectuated internalisation of an MNE in that market?  
The article is organised as follows: in the next section (section 2) we discuss the roles 
of management that are currently provided for in internalisation theory and present a basic 
conceptual framework that includes changing internalisation pressures over time. In section 3 we 
examine various dynamic drivers of internalisation, which trigger either increasing costs of using 
an external organisation (i.e. increased market transaction costs) or decreasing costs of using an 
internal organisation (e.g. reduced penalty costs of underutilized production capacity). In section 
4 we delineate the managerial scope of internalisation in terms of enabling gradual internalisation 
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with a minimum of renegotiation costs. In section 5 we examine the various assets of an outside 
agent that may be subject to internalisation. Internalisation theory has primarily focused on 
appropriation of financial assets (including equity) with less attention to the various ways MNEs 
internalise non-financial assets of local operators. We conceptualise financial and non-financial 
assets by configuring the assets in relation to a value chain template. Furthermore we translate 
this configuration of financial and non-financial assets into a formal expression of the degree to 
which an MNE has internalised operations pertaining to a foreign market. Section 6 examines 
different modus operandi of ‘staged internalisation’ in relation to financial as well as non-
financial assets. We exemplify how MNEs may put in place options for gradual internalisation in 
relation to the equity of the local operator, but also in relation to non-financial assets. The section 
includes a number of practical examples of how MNEs at the initial point of foreign market entry 
can put in place options for gradual internalisation in order to curb the renegotiation costs of 
multiple contract adjustments at later points in time. We conclude by discussing the possible 
extension of internalisation theory with the management of ‘staged internalisation’ (section 7) – 
thereby drawing attention to the scope for further development of internalisation theory in a more 
managerial and dynamic direction. 
 
2. Developing internalisation theory 
 
Existing internalisation theory basically assigns three roles to MNE management, see Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Management roles in existing internalisation theory 
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Firstly, managers need to decide whether the MNE should produce at home and export to the 
foreign market in question or produce in the foreign market (see e.g. Horst 1974). Secondly, the 
managers face a make-or-buy choice whenever localisation advantages favour production in the 
foreign market (Dunning 1980). Thirdly, managers have to decide the timing of internalisation 
(Buckley/Casson 1981) in cases where the ‘buy’ choice precedes internalisation1. 
Seeing market exchange as the ‘default option’, internalisation theorists have first of 
all focused on the identification and analysis of various market imperfections that may result in 
internalisation. Since theorists have focused on a market efficiency rather than market power 
explanation (see e.g. Calvet, 1981), MNE managers have been assigned a ‘neoclassical’ role as 
omniscient administrators of market imperfections – and not creators of market imperfections2. 
In this perspective the managerial task in internalisation theory is first of all to observe the 
various – mostly exogenous - factors of choice relevance, and only to a limited extent to involve 
oneself in complex managerial discretion. Exact observation of internalisation-relevant factors 
(such as market size and degree of asset specificity) univocally directs the right choice. 
Furthermore, the choices are relatively simple ones: produce at home or in the foreign market; 
make-or-buy; when to internalise?   
Our discussion of new and more profound management aspects in relation to 
internalisation theory takes as a departure point Buckley’s (1993) article entitled ‘the role of 
management in internalisation theory’. In that article Buckley concludes that, at the beginning of 
the 1990s, there was considerable room for developing internalisation theory in a more 
management-oriented direction. This was not to say that the role of management was ignored 
inasmuch as “strategic behaviour can be identified within the internalisation framework by firms 
securing exclusive access to key inputs and tieing in customers” (p. 206). In particular, Buckley 
stresses the need for theory development incorporating a more important role for management in 
the following two, closely interrelated issues: 
1) The theory maintains a rather static view of internalisation – being considered a state rather 
than a process. Hence, “to incorporate a theory of management, it is essential to move away 
from a comparison of states to a comparison of processes… Progress can be made by 
comparisons of the changing balance of the boundary between ‘firm’ and ‘market’ and 
intermediate states over given time periods” (Buckley 1993, p. 201).  
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2) There is an oversimplified choice for managers between markets and hierarchies. Hence, 
“the narrow view that managers simply make ‘buy or build’ decisions … needs to be 
extended” (Buckley 1993, p. 206).  
 
The two issues point in the same direction, namely that internalisation may be a long-term 
manageable process rather than a time-compressed, binary choice3. The contextual focus of this 
paper is those situations where non-hierarchical entry modes enjoy a temporal superiority over 
hierarchical modes (for reasons that will be elaborated on in the next section). As an example, 
licensing or joint ventures may be used before wholly-owned production subsidiaries, or 
independent distributors may precede sales subsidiaries. 
 Against this background we use the term, staged internalisation, for those cases where 
the transition from non-hierarchical to hierarchical foreign operation modes unfolds as a managed 
and stepwise process. We contend that the potential pay-off to MNEs of undertaking staged 
internalisation may be considerable: at any point in time an ideal outcome for the firm would be 
when the degree to which a firm has internalised its foreign activities is in perfect balance with 
the underlying drivers of internalisation. For example, a MNE typically uses many, different 
value added activities in a given foreign market. Some of the activities in this country may be 
characterised by a high degree of asset specificity whereas other activities have low specificity. 
Because of considerable scale and scope economies and local market knowledge enjoyed by a 
local, outside agent (e.g. a licensee of the MNE), the entrant MNE only internalises local 
activities for which a high degree of control is considered to be of utmost importance, such as 
R&D (Buckley/Hashai 2005). Furthermore, the MNE internalises more and more value added 
activities in the foreign country as the degree of asset specificity of these activities grows, which 
typically occurs in small, consecutive steps (see argument below in coverage of dynamic drivers). 
Figure 2 illustrates three scenarios that are different in terms of the fit between 
underlying internalisation drivers (indicated by the broken line), such as increasing asset 
specificity, and effectuated internalisation of operations in a given foreign market (indicated by 
the full line). It is assumed that the underlying pressure for internalisation (or, internalisation 
advantage) increases monotonically with elapsed time of operations in the foreign market. Thus, 
the X-axis indicates elapsed time of operations in the market and the Y-axis the degree to which 
the foreign market operations is internalised (measured as a continuum from 0-100 %).  
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Figure 2a: Immediate full internalisation 
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Figure 2a depicts a scenario of immediate internalisation that, for example, may be 
justified by excessively high anticipated/potential switching costs (Benito/Pedersen/Petersen 
1999). Such a scenario is typically assumed in the entry mode literature, especially that based on 
transaction cost economics, as illustrated by the following statement in the much-cited study of 
foreign distribution by Anderson and Coughlan (1987, 71): “Channel choices, once made, are 
often difficult to change. Hence, the question of whether to integrate foreign distribution can have 
a large and lasting impact on the success of a firm's international operations.”  
The situation depicted in Figure 2a is one in which internalisation, although 
economically justified by potential switching costs, actually is ‘premature’ inasmuch as the 
hierarchical operation mode – the wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) – in contrast to for example a 
local, independent licensee – operates below minimum efficient scale during the first years after 
market entry. Hence, the governance structure is sub-optimal in terms of production costs 
(although perhaps not with regard to transaction and switching costs). The sub-optimisation in 
terms of production costs (i.e. sacrificed scale economies) is indicated by the grey area. Figure 2b 
illustrates a scenario with one shift of governance structure – from a contractual mode (e.g. 
licensing) to the hierarchical mode (WOS). The shift halves the sub-optimisation (grey) area.4  
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Figure 2b: Internalisation – one step 
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The sub-optimisation area is further reduced when the MNE makes two shifts of 
governance structures/operation modes (see Figure 2c). The first shift is from a contractual 
arrangement to a 50/50 equity joint venture, and later from a joint venture to a sole venture 
(WOS) – i.e. a hierarchical organisation.  
Figure 2c: Internalisation – two steps 
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Altogether, the three scenarios show that the sub-optimisation area diminishes as the 
number of shifts – or internalisation steps – increases. Ideally, a perfect concurrence between the 
particular need for internalisation at a certain point in time – which would be determined by the 
underlying internalisation drivers – and the actual internalisation at that point in time would 
eliminate the sub-optimisation area completely. It is also clear that there is a trade-off between – 
on the one side – production cost savings due to perfect concurrence obtained through frequent 
internalization steps, and – on the other side – the additional transaction costs in the form of 
renegotiation costs. A basic premise of our line of reasoning is that while achieving a perfect fit 
between the underlying internalisation drivers and the effectuated internalisation may have a high 
payoff, it also constitutes a major managerial challenge.  
 
3.  Dynamic drivers of internalisation 
 
Why is it that a MNE should not always internalise its activities in a foreign country overnight? 
What are the drivers that over time gradually build pressure for internalisation as the activities in 
the foreign country unfold, and therefore suggest that effectuation of internalisation should be 
gradual as well? There are many dynamic drivers of internalisation (as well as drivers of 
externalisation, as pointed out in for example the franchising literature). The aim of this section is 
not to provide a comprehensive account of these drivers. Rather, we focus on four drivers, which 
are prominent in the business economics literature. The four drivers of internalisation covered in 
this section fall into two main groups: (i) those that increase the transaction costs of (external) 
markets and (ii) those that decrease the governance costs of internal organisation.5
 The archetypal dynamic driver of market transaction costs is captured by 
Williamson’s (1975) notion of ‘fundamental transformation’: the change from a large to a small 
numbers bargaining situation and eventually a bilateral monopoly – a lock-in situation. The 
increasing economic interdependency between the two parties – in casu an entrant MNE and a 
local operator – builds up a pressure for internalisation. The key issue is increasing asset 
specificity (Williamson, 1975, 1985): Mutual supplier-buyer adaptation implying non-negligible 
relationship-specific investments bring about a change from a large to a small numbers 
bargaining/exchange situation between the exchanging economic agents. The ‘lock-in’ situation 
leads to exceedingly costly haggling about the quasi-rents resulting from the mutual adaptation 
that, in turn, motivates a move away from an arm’s length market structure to a hierarchical 
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governance structure. Hence, Williamson describes a process – the fundamental transformation – 
of increasing asset specificity eventually leading to internalisation, but the governance structure is 
either market or hierarchy6. In other words, the internalisation is presented as a one-off switch. 
The dynamic drivers leading to decreasing governance costs of internal organization 
are of mainly three types: (a) increasing sales volume or market size; (b) diminishing market 
uncertainty through experiential learning, and (c) release of management resources. Usually, the 
three drivers cannot, by themselves, justify internalisation – they only bring down the cost of 
using hierarchical modes to an equivalent level of the costs of arm’s length and contractual 
solutions. In other words, they do not really constitute ‘pressure’ for internalisation. Instead, they 
lower the threshold of internalisation should market imperfections arise, such as hold-up 
situations motivated by asset specificity (Williamson, 1983).  
 
(a) Increasing sales volume or market size (Buckley/Casson 1981): Growing market size may 
constitute an internalisation driver inasmuch as contractual operation methods (e.g. licensing) in 
general are more economical at a small or medium local market size than are investment modes  
 
Figure 3: Market growth as a driver of internalisation 
Market sizeQ*
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CCONTRACT
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such as wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS). In Figure 3 the market size Q* indicates the ‘switch 
point’ where the costs of operating a contractual foreign operation mode (Ccontract) are equal to 
those of an investment mode (CWOS). In this presentation the entrant firm faces a make-or-buy 
choice: either contract or WOS (as we disregard the location choice between export and local 
production). Again, the internalisation is presented as a one-off phenomenon. 
 
(b) Reduced market uncertainty through experiential learning (Johanson/Vahlne 1977): The 
entrant firm’s acquisition of foreign market knowledge reduces perceived market risk and 
uncertainty which, in turn, prompts the entrant firm to internalise, e.g. switching from a sales 
agent to a sales subsidiary – see Figure 4. In Johanson and Vahlne’s model, internalisation comes 
about as a result of a learning process. However, it is less clear to what extent the internalisation 
as such – the switch from a sales agent to a sales subsidiary – is a process as well. Johanson and 
Vahlne (1977) suggest a gradual increasing resource commitment to the foreign market, although 
the archival data of the four Swedish MNEs, from which Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) 
derived an ‘establishment chain’, indicated a one-off switch – not a process.7  
 
Figure 4: Experiential learning as a driver of internalisation 
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(c) Release of management resources (Penrose 1956, 1959): Penrose demonstrated how growing 
managerial scope economies release management resources that, in turn, can be employed in the 
establishment of foreign production subsidiaries (see Penrose 1956). In general, the growth of an 
entrant MNE may free financial funds and human resources that enable internalization, although 
the international management literature points to the many frictions that limit the exercise of such 
resources in an international context. Whereas the growth of the (entrant) firm is a process per se, 
it seems to be unresolved in the literature whether the internalisation that arises from the growth 
should be viewed as a one-off event or a process.   
In sum, the extant business economics literature gives us a general picture of various 
underlying drivers or forces promoting internalisation, including increasing market size, 
experiential learning, firm growth, and increasing mutual interdependency (asset specificity). The 
internalisation as such, however, is either assumed to be in place from the outset (as a hierarchical 
entry mode), or exercised as a one-off switch from externalisation (‘market’) to internalisation 
(‘hierarchy’). In the latter case, increasing pressure for internalisation of local market activities 
builds up and at a certain point in time the MNE exercises complete internalisation – as illustrated 
in Figure 2b.  
Alternatively, one may envisage internalisation as a stepwise, even incremental 
process, where effectuated internalisation is synchronised with the underlying drivers of learning, 
growth, etc. In other words, the internalisation unfolds as the need grows. Rather than making a 
dichotomous make-or-buy choice, entrant MNEs combine make and buy modes until a 100% 
internalisation eventually – if ever – is completed. By combining externalisation and 
internalisation in an optimal blend the entrant firm gets the best of both worlds. A practical 
example of this is found among international franchisers that, at any point in time, aim at 
managing an optimal mix of franchised and company-owned outlets. Of course, when studying 
the dynamics of international franchising, the internalisation case is frequently reversed with the 
franchisor undertaking gradual externalisation by diminishing the proportion of company-owned 
outlets (Fladmoe-Lindquist/Jacque 1995, Lafontaine/Kaufman 1992, Welch/Benito/Petersen 
2007). Nevertheless, there are many cases of franchising companies following a pattern of taking 
over (i.e. internalising) previously franchised outlets – because of problems encountered in 
specific foreign markets or more generally with the franchise system, or due to changes in 
business strategy and the development of confidence in directly running outlets as experience and 
learning develop. Because of problems with some of its franchisees in the UK, the Tie Rack chain 
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terminated these franchises and embarked on a policy of opening new outlets on a company-
owned basis because of this experience (Gourlay 1994). It is noteworthy that McDonald’s has 
maintained a strong company-owned outlets emphasis in the UK and Japan (via a JV) in contrast 
to its more general position of emphasising franchising (Welch/Benito/Petersen 2007). 
 In a scenario of incremental internalisation we implicitly assume away the occurrence 
of switching costs. However, without careful planning, stepwise internalisation is not feasible or 
excessively expensive. As a consequence, internalisation becomes the initial and permanent mode 
(see Figure 2a), or the internalisation takes place as a single one-off switch in order to reduce 
switching costs (see Figure 2b). However, real options and switching cost studies – see, for 
example, Kogut (1991) and Petersen, Welch and Welch (2000) – suggest that entrant firms might 
be able to reduce switching costs through careful planning and managerial discretion. The role of 
‘managerial discretion’ in internalisation theory is discussed next.    
 
4. Delineating the managerial scope of internalisation  
 
The dynamic drivers of internalisation outlined in the previous section have in common that they 
tend to be less susceptible to managerial influence. Market growth is to a large extent determined 
by exogenous factors; release of management resources depends on the scope economies of the 
MNE as a whole; experiential learning is determined by the nature of activities undertaken and 
outcomes from them, and elapsed time, rather than by management, although management does 
have a role in the choice of activities to be undertaken; and asset specificity is mainly on the part 
of the local operator inasmuch as the investments of the MNE are country rather than 
relationship-specific. Since the dynamic drivers are underlying drivers largely beyond the scope 
of management, the benefits of gradual internalisation are more or less given seen through the 
lens of the MNE manager. Figure 5 depicts the marginal cost (MC) and benefit (MB) of the 
frequency of internalisation, i.e. the number of internalisation steps within a given time period in 
a given foreign market. The MB curve follows the same assumptions as in Figure 2a-c: since the 
pressure for internalisation increases proportionately with the elapsed time of operations in a 
given foreign market, the sub-optimization area divides into halves for every additional 
internalisation step. Hence: 
MB = ϕ (½)S-1  where, 
MB = marginal benefit of one additional internalisation step;  
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ϕ = cost reduction obtained by introducing a first, single internalisation step (see Figure 2b); 
S = number of internalisation steps within the observed time period. 
 
Figure 5: Management scope of internalisation 
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The MB curve has a strong downward slope and moves asymptotically towards zero 
(the X-axis). In this scenario, the benefit of more than five internalisation steps is diminutive. The 
marginal cost of internalisation (MC) is assumed constant8. However, the cost level across the 
internalisation steps is assumed to be strongly influenced by MNE managers. Managers’ potential 
influence on MC levels is indicated by including three different horizontal cost lines in Figure 5: 
MC > MC* > MC**. The upper cost line, MC, does not intersect with the MB curve at any point 
simply because the potential additional renegotiation cost exceeds the marginal benefit at any 
internalisation step – even the first, most beneficial. The MC* line intersects the MB curve at two 
internalisation steps. Hence, the MNE will be better off by making one additional internalisation 
step beyond its initial step and will neither be better or worse off by taking the extra 
internalisation step. The MB-MC** intersection is found at five internalisation steps. The level of 
renegotiation costs in the MC* and MC** cases are significantly lower than in the MC case – 
indicating that the MNE managers have been much more successful in putting in place options 
for gradual internalisation at market entry9, and these options effectively curb renegotiation costs 
later on. A prerequisite for the elucidation of options for gradual internalisation is the 
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conceptualisation and operationalisation of ‘staged internalisation’ and a portrayal of different 
ways in which it might unfold. Hence, in the next section we develop a conceptual framework for 
analysing how ‘staged internalisation’ is practised by MNEs and how the degree of internalisation 
can be measured in formal terms.  
 
5. Conceptualisation and measurement of ‘staged internalisation’  
 
In order to elucidate options for gradual internalisation we should clarify the various ways in 
which entrant firms, step by step, can take over the foreign market operations of a local outside 
agent. Until now, internalisation theorists have mainly associated internalisation processes with 
MNEs’ appropriation of the financial assets – notably equity – of the local operator. However, 
internalisation processes may, just as well, take place through appropriation of specific, non-
financial assets: tangible assets, such as specialised tools/machinery, as well as intangible assets, 
e.g. goodwill in relation to tieing in local key personnel, suppliers and customers. The process-
wise internalisation of (non-financial) assets may be described along three different value chain 
dimensions, see Figure 6. 
   
Figure 6: Internalisation of foreign markets assets along three dimensions 
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 (a) Internalisation of product-specific assets: The first dimension of internalisation of non-
financial assets (indicated by the left-hand axis in Figure 6) pertains to the multiplicity of value 
chains, or product families, that a local operator may operate on behalf of a MNE. Hence, an 
MNE may have licensed out several product or process technologies to one or more local 
operators. Each licence may constitute a separate value chain. Altogether, the value chains make 
up the ‘value system’ (Porter 1985) operated in the foreign market by a MNE single-handedly or 
in collaboration with local operators. As an example, until recently the Danish pharmaceutical 
MNE, Lundbeck A/S (producer of medicine for the treatment of diseases of the central nervous 
system) had two licence arrangements in the Chinese market which related to two different 
product families of medicine. Another example is the Indian operations of Norsk Hydro, a 
Norwegian MNE that was very diversified until quite recently. During the 1990s, the various 
divisions of Norsk Hydro had licensed out production technologies of different product families 
to local operators (Tomassen/Welch/Benito 1998). However, for reasons of simplification only 
two value chains (product families) are indicated in Figure 6; but of course, some MNEs may 
operate numerous value chains in a single foreign market – as in the Norsk Hydro example. An 
MNE can internalise foreign market activities by pulling back product licences one by one until it 
has resumed control of all its products produced and marketed in the foreign country. In this case 
the focal non-financial assets are the user rights (licences) held by the local operator. By the non-
renewal of its licences the MNE ‘appropriates’ these assets from the local operator and 
internalises the foreign market activities. Note that in this case no financial assets (equity) have 
been acquired by the entrant MNE. 
 
(b) Internalisation of activity-specific assets: A second internalisation process dimension 
(indicated by the upper axis in Figure 6) pertains to assets of specific activities of the individual 
value chains operated by local, outside agents. In Figure 6 value adding activities are, again, 
simplified into only two activities: an upstream activity and a downstream activity (hence, we 
disregard the business reality that in most cases foreign market operations are composed of 
numerous discernible activities). As an example of internalisation of an upstream activity asset, a 
MNE may provide specialised machinery to a foreign contract manufacturer. Because the 
machinery can be used only in relation to manufacturing for the MNE (and not other customers) 
the contract manufacturer could tackle this asset specificity problem by leasing instead of buying 
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the specialised machinery from the MNE. To illustrate internalisation of a downstream activity 
asset take the example of a MNE paying salaries to individuals in the local distributor’s 
organisation on the condition that these individuals focus entirely on sales of the exporter’s 
products. In this example the focal, non-financial and intangible asset is goodwill in the form of 
tieing in key sales and marketing personnel of the local, outside agent. By putting key personnel 
on its own payroll the MNE ‘appropriates’ goodwill assets of the local operator. Other examples 
of internalisation assets related to downstream activities comprise wholesale activities 
(Petersen/Welch 2000), marketing (Williamson 1992), and after-sales activities 
(Gabrielsson/Kirpalani/Luostarinen 2002). 
  
(c) Internalisation of customer-specific assets: The third, and last, internalisation process 
dimension (indicated by the right-hand axis in Figure 6) is pertinent to assets of customer or 
supplier relationships.10 A MNE may gradually internalise the foreign market operations by 
converting local customers (or, groups of customers) to ‘house accounts’ one by one. Hence, the 
MNE ‘appropriates’ the outside agent’s goodwill assets in the form of tieing in customers. The 
case of Guess! Italia S.r.l. is an illustration of this form of internalisation. Guess! Inc. is an US 
producer of higher-end, fashionable jeans and various accessories. The US company licensed the 
rights to market and sell its products in Europe to Guess! Italia S.r.l. After a management change 
in 2004 Guess Italia embarked on a policy of converting the larger and more important local 
customers (retailers) in European markets to ‘house accounts’ (Source: Personal communication 
with local distributors).  International franchisors usually externalise activities by converting 
company-owned outlets to franchised outlets. But, as noted earlier, sometimes franchisors turn 
around the process and internalise outlets (and thereby ‘appropriate’ customer relationships 
within given sales districts). As an example, Yum Brands Inc. – the operator of KFC and Pizza 
Hut in China – during 2005 moved from franchised to company-owned outlets in certain Chinese 
sales districts as a reaction to various problems encountered with local franchisees 
(http://www.franchiseek.com/China/Franchise_China_News_0505.htm).11 In Figure 6 we have 
indicated a situation where only two customers (or, customer groups) are served in the foreign 
market. 
 
 As a general rule, internalisation of non-financial assets of local operators pertains to 
specific products (product families), value-adding activities, or customers (customer groups). In 
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contrast, when MNEs acquire financial assets of local operators these assets are usually not 
related to any specific product, activity, or customer, but are pertinent to the value creation of the 
local operator as a whole. Hence, a 50 % equity share of the local operator implies internalisation 
of 50 % of all assets across products, activities, and customers. However, exceptions to this 
general rule may apply. In principle, a MNE may acquire financial assets (equity) of joint 
ventures that are established for a very specific purpose, such as the marketing and sales of a 
certain product, the conduct of certain activities (e.g. R&D), or to focus on a certain customer 
segment. Keeping in mind this possibility of acquiring both financial and non-financial assets in 
relation to specific products/activities/customers we can express a MNE’s degree of 
internalisation in relation to a given foreign market by the following equation:  
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where 
Ix = Focal MNE’s degree of internalisation (in country x) 
i = specific product (family) 
j = specific value chain activity 
k = specific customer (group) 
E = MNE’s ownership share 
nfA = non-financial asset 
 
In the (special) case of a 50/50 % equity joint venture with a local operator in country x, E would 
equal 0.5 for any non-financial asset (nfA) in that country. In cases where no equity joint ventures 
are formed with the local operator, E may equal any value in the interval {0;1} (0 ≤ E ≤ 1).  
 
6.  Examples of options for gradual internalisation  
 
After having conceptualised and operationalised ‘staged internalisation’ we can now address the 
question of how, in practice, MNE managers can stage the internalisation process by putting in 
place options for gradual internalisation. As stressed in the previous section, managers’ creation 
of options for gradual internalisation at local operators in foreign markets may pertain not only to 
acquisition of equity, but also to non-financial assets relating to products, value added activities, 
and customers. These non-financial asset categories are by no means definitive, but they do 
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identify the business reality that firms may use a variety of creative ways of absorbing and 
controlling a foreign partner beyond equity arrangements. In this section we will briefly outline 
each of the four aspects (equity included) and provide some practical examples of how MNE 
managers may be able to put in place options for gradual internalisation.  
 
Options for gradual internalisation in relation to financial assets (equity) 
Internalisation of equity is well-described in the international joint venture literature, although the 
focus has mainly been on institutional factors as determinants of changing ownership structures 
(see e.g. Gomez-Casseres 1987, Hennart 1988). In a study of entry strategies in emerging 
markets, Meyer and Tran (2006) coin the term ‘staged acquisition’ (similar to the term ‘dynamic 
market entry’ used by Buckley, 2007) to describe stepwise acquisition of a foreign partner. This 
is illustrated by reference to the case of ‘staged acquisitions’ practised in Poland and Vietnam by 
the international brewer Carlsberg. In these two emerging markets Carlsberg increased, in several 
rounds, its holding of equity shares in the two local operators – which at the same time were a 
licensee and a joint venture partner of Carlsberg. What was initially a minority stake was 
eventually turned into a majority stake or full acquisition. The Norwegian company Nera, a 
producer of low and medium capacity microwave radio link systems, followed a similar pattern 
when it entered the Indian market (Welch/Benito/Petersen 2007). Nera initially opted for a joint 
venture arrangement with an Indian partner, established in 1992, in which Nera held a 30 per cent 
equity position. This was extended in 1994 to a 45 per cent holding. Today, its subsidiary in India 
is a 100 per cent owned daughter company.  
Such gradual acquisitions may be implemented via ad-hoc purchases of equity shares 
or through planned buy-out options. For example, Wal-Mart bought a six per cent stake in the 
Japanese supermarket chain Seiyu in 2002, but part of the agreement was an option to raise that 
share to 66.7% by 2007. It exercised part of that option just nine months later with an increase to 
37% (Fackler/Zimmerman 2003). This was gradually increased to 53% by mid-2007. From the 
perspective of staged internalisation, such optional buy-out arrangements, negotiated and assented 
to from the outset, are of particular interest. The case of Nilfisk A/S (a Danish producer of 
industrial vacuum cleaners) is an illustration of the consequences of not having equity buy-out 
options in place at market entry. In Spain - one of its major markets - the company was only 
allowed to acquire a 10 % equity share of the local distributor, Nilfisk Aspiradoras – a very 
successful family-owned company. As a consequence of a general policy of majority control of its 
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international distribution network, Nilfisk insisted on increasing its equity share. However, the 
Spanish distributor took exception to this move and engaged in a bitter legal dispute with Nilfisk 
to prevent it occurring (Petersen/Welch/Welch 2000). Similarly, Buckley (2007, p. 122) has 
observed that “flexibility in altering ownership choice in China is limited because the switching 
costs are high.” Rather than negotiate options at the outset, companies may create contractual 
handcuffs that remove equity adjustment possibilities for some period of time. For example, in a 
recent joint venture deal between the multinational brewers SAB Miller and Molson Coors, 
covering operations in the US and Puerto Rico, the agreement includes a clause preventing either 
party from seeking shares in the other company for a period of 10 years (press release, 9 October 
2007).   
 
Options for gradual internalisation in relation to non-financial assets 
Over time, an entrant MNE tends to take control of (i.e. ownership of) more and more non-
financial assets of its local operator in the foreign market even though a seemingly arm’s length 
contractual mode may be used. The acquired assets will typically be characterised by a high 
degree of specificity. Our presentation of practical examples of options for gradual internalisation 
will follow the 3-dimensional categorisation of non-financial assets outlined in the previous 
section. Hence, we start with internalisation of product-specific assets and the possible options 
that an MNE may put in place in relation hitherto: 
 
Internalisation of product-specific assets (user rights, licensees): The entrant MNE, after having 
operated in a country with different licensing or other contractual arrangements, might move to 
acquire – or rather, withdraw – the user rights originally handed over to, for example, the local 
licensee or franchisee. In the case where several user rights are licensed out, the entrant MNE 
may choose to negotiate with the licensees separately and pull them back one by one. As an 
example, the before-mentioned Danish pharmaceutical MNE, Lundbeck A/S (producer of 
medicine for the treatment of diseases of the central nervous system) chose not to renew some of 
its licensing contracts with its Chinese distributors in 2006 as part of a new market strategy of 
upgrading its own presence in a rapidly growing market (Source: Personal communication). 
Licensing can also play a seemingly contrary internalisation role in that it is sometimes used by 
companies to extend control in joint venture situations. A licensing agreement with a JV partner 
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which covers aspects such as management and marketing can be a means of delivering greater 
control of the JV operation in general (Welch/Benito/Petersen 2007). 
 
Internalisation of activity-specific assets: 
As an example of internalisation of non-financial assets specific to upstream value chain 
activities, the entrant MNE might place specialized machinery or staff at the disposal of a local 
OEM supplier. This could be associated with a concern about keeping control of key intellectual 
capital, particularly technology. The Japanese company Kyocera goes to considerable lengths to 
protect key intellectual property when manufacturing in other countries, as described by their 
technology and strategy manager: “Workers in its overseas plants are told precisely how to mix 
materials from Japan with local ones, but are given no idea what the ingredients are. When a part 
breaks on an advanced machine overseas, Kyocera’s Japanese engineers disassemble and repair it 
in privacy, so that none of the local workers can take a good look” (Economist 2004, p. 67). 
Similarly, in outsourcing situations, in order to assure quality and delivery timeliness, many 
companies extend their involvement in their contractees’ operations beyond arm’s length 
purchases. For example, “Nike expatriates become permanent personnel in each factory 
producing Nike footwear, functioning as liaisons with corporate R&D, headquarters, and 
worldwide quality assurance and product development efforts”, so that contractees are more 
tightly locked into Nike’s network and operations (Quinn/Hilmer 1994, p. 51). Such tie-ins can be 
a stepping-stone to equity arrangements (Welch/Benito/Petersen 2007).  
  As an example of internalisation of human assets specific to downstream activities, 
Petersen (1996) reports on Danish exporting firms that were paying salaries to individuals in the 
local distributor’s organisation on the condition that these individuals focus entirely on sales of 
the exporter’s products. An exporting firm reported that in order to ‘persuade’ the local 
distributor to allow this kind of ‘headhunting’ it had to pay considerable overheads - 30 % of the 
wage paid to the specialized product manager was extended to the local distributor. Hence, an 
initial negotiation of payment of overheads to the local operator in order to achieve acceptance of 
this human asset internalisation would qualify as an internalisation option. More generally, it is 
clear that some companies are able to use such staffing arrangements as part of a stepping-stone 
to eventual takeover of the foreign distributor’s operation (Petersen/Welch/Welch 2000). 
Integration of assets of specific value added activities is based on a division of responsibilities 
between the entrant MNE and the local operator (Buckley/Hashai 2004,2005, 
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Gabrielsson/Kirpalani/Luostarinen 2002, Petersen/Welch 2002). Effectively, this is a case of 
mode combination (Welch/Benito/Petersen 2007). The entrant MNE takes over more and more 
value chain activities in the local market. As an example, the entrant firm only performs upstream 
activities initially, but over a period of time the local distributor hands over downstream activities 
to the entrant firm (Williamson 1992). During the 1990s the Danish MNE, Coloplast A/S (a 
producer of wound-care and incontinence products for hospitals), practised such a policy (Source: 
Personal communication). The policy was formulated as a three-step process where, first, the 
activities most closely related to end-customers (e.g. marketing) were internalised, then the 
ordinary sales activities, and lastly physical distribution, including warehousing and 
transportation.  
 
Internalisation of customer-specific assets: Here, the entrant MNE is tieing in more and more 
customers in the foreign market by converting them to ‘house accounts’ 
(Coughlan/Anderson/Stern/El-Ansary 2006). In this way local distributors are gradually phased 
out of the market. Dutta, Bergen, Heide and John (1995) explain this dual distribution 
phenomenon by the principal’s quest for better evaluation of local agents and by the principal’s 
desire for posing credible threats of termination. From a staged internalisation perspective, the 
termination of local distributors is not kept as a threat, but is actually carried out over a period of 
time. The above-mentioned case of Guess! Italia S.r.l. (licensed producer of higher-end, 
fashionable jeans and various accessories) is an illustration of this approach. As mentioned earlier, 
in 2004 the Italian management group embarked on a policy of converting the larger and more 
important local customers (retailers) to ‘house accounts’. The local distributors were compensated 
by a 7% commission on sales at the wholesale level on these ‘house accounts’ (Source: Personal 
communication with local distributors). In some of its larger national markets, such as Spain and 
France, the intention was clearly to internalise the entire business. Although Guess! Italia did not 
formulate its ‘house account’ policy at the time of the initial market entry, the offered ‘house 
account’ commission contributed to the creation of a type of internalisation option. A clearer 
option would, for example, be an initial agreement in which it is stipulated that all local customers 
engaging in cross-national activities are to be converted at some future point to ‘house accounts’ 
against suitable compensation. However, in many cases options for gradual internalisation are 
emergent – growing out of the development of the relationship between the parties, and related 
market knowledge improvement (Petersen/Welch/Welch 2000).  
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 7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have applied a process view to the internalisation actions of MNEs and explored 
management issues in relation to this process. The suggested new management role in 
internalisation theory – managing a process, in part through the creation of options for gradual 
internalisation – is less susceptible to simple rules or choices and therefore lessens the 
deterministic flaw in existing internalisation theory. As has been demonstrated, a MNE may 
internalise a local operator in various ways – not only through acquisition of financial assets 
(equity), but also via ‘appropriation’ of non-financial assets specific to products, activities and 
customers. The idea of creating options for gradual internalisation is by no means new but the 
variety of areas in which these options can be put in place is hardly recognised in the IB literature 
(see Rugman/Li 2005 for an overview of the real option concept applied to international 
investments). Real options are not only of relevance to internalisation of equity, but also to 
internalisation of non-financial assets of the local operator. Further contributing to the managerial 
challenge of creating options for gradual internalisation is the wide range of ways in which these 
 
Figure 7: ‘New’ management roles in internalisation theory 
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options can be designed.12 The new management role in internalisation theory of creating options 
for gradual internalisation is indicated by the box in the right-hand side of Figure 7 (see also 
Figure 1). As emphasised earlier, the creation of options potentially has a huge impact on the 
make-or-buy choice as well as the timing of internalisation inasmuch as these – until now – 
relatively simple managerial choices suddenly become much more open-ended and consequently 
highlight the decision-making skills of MNE managers. 
Hence, taking Buckley’s (1993) discussion of the role of management in 
internalisation theory as our point of departure, we conclude that – fifteen years later – there is 
still considerable scope for developing the theory in a more managerial and practice-oriented 
direction. Our attempt at developing the theory of internalisation has focused on how the 
internalisation could be prepared and exercised when local outside agents in the foreign market 
(intermediaries, licensees, franchisees and the like) are used as temporary entry modes. Building 
on insights from recent international business literature as well as from marketing and 
management literature, we have provided examples of how management can play an active and 
substantive role in situations where the market transaction costs of using outside agents are 
negligible at market entry, but grow over time. The creation of options for gradual internalisation 
is a key aspect of attaining perfect concurrence between changing internalisation advantages and 
the operation methods used in a foreign market. Options for gradual internalisation pertain not 
only to ‘staged acquisition’ (Meyer and Tran, 2006), but also to the appropriation of non-financial 
assets of the independent local operator. 
 Our investigation of the conceptual issues surrounding internalisation in a more 
dynamic context, with a more invasive role for managers, demonstrates the scope for 
development in this direction. Inevitably, there is much to be accomplished in further conceptual 
clarification and extension of the ideas presented in this article. In addition, the many empirical 
illustrations used point to the need for more focused empirical studies that explore and extend the 
empirical foundation for concepts such as staged internalisation and the creation of options for 
gradual internalisation.   
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Endnotes  
 
1 As indicated in Figure 6 internalisation theory may include two more management roles although one 
may consider these to be at the periphery of the theory, namely (a) the timing of initial export replacement 
with local production (‘offshoring’), and (b) the specific choice of mode of operation in the case of a ‘buy’ 
decision (Contractor 1990, Datta/Herrmann/Rasheed 2002). 
 
2 In some models based on internalisation theory, MNE managers are assumed ‘bounded’ and not fully 
rational (see e.g. Buckley/Casson/Gulamhussen 2001). 
 
3 Of course, in those situations where no markets – not even contractual ones – exist, internalisation from 
the outset is the sole foreign entry mode, and it is meaningless to talk about internalisation processes 
(other than post-internalisation processes – such as post-acquisition integration processes). Most often, 
however, non-hierarchical entries (i.e. arm’s length, contractual modes, and shared ownership operations 
in foreign markets) are feasible alternatives to establishing wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
 
4 This can be viewed as somewhat simplistic as it is clear that many companies using, for example, 
licensing employ a range of techniques within licensing arrangements to ensure that a degree of control or 
internalisation of the licensee is generated (Welch/Benito/Petersen 2007). 
 
5 Many of the issues raised are approached from a different perspective in, for example, the literature on 
international marketing and distribution, in dealing with aspects such as trust and interpersonal 
relationships between foreign intermediaries and exporters (Nes/Solberg/Silkoset 2007). 
 
6 However, later on Williamson (1991) included contractual governance structures as “hybrid forms”, 
thereby leaving a strict market-hierarchy framework. 
 
7 Petersen, Welch, and Nielsen (2001) discuss this discrepancy between the theoretical and 
empirical/operational level of Johanson and Vahlne’s model and outline how an incremental learning 
process in fact may be echoed in an incremental internalisation process. Also, as firms increase their 
knowledge about internationalisation in general and their understanding of specific foreign markets in 
particular, they will tend to focus more on the – and thereby uncover unsatisfactory instances of – market 
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performance of their outside agents. As a result, the perceived relative costs and benefits of internal versus 
external coordination shift in favour of internalised solutions. 
 
8 This simplified assumption reflects two opposite theoretical arguments: MC should decrease as a result 
of experience curve effects (Henderson/BCG, 1974). Conversely, MC should increase as a consequence of 
still higher asset specificity and, in turn, more and more costly haggling about the (growing) quasi-rents 
(Williamson, 1985). It is an unresolved empirical question as to whether the net effect is positive or 
negative. 
 
9 MC includes the pre-entry cost of negotiating options for gradual internalisation. Potentially, contingent 
claim contracts may infer prohibitively high ink costs (Williamson, 1978; Hart, 1988). Hence, as a pre-
condition for low MC, MNE management should be able to negotiate effective options for gradual 
internalization with a local operator at relatively low costs. See also section 6 for examples of relatively 
simple options for gradual internalisation. 
  
10 For reasons of simplification our argumentation will revolve around market seeking, rather than 
resource- or efficiency-seeking MNEs (Dunning 1993). Therefore, we focus on customer relationships 
only, but similar arguments apply to supplier-relationships of resource-seeking MNEs. 
 
11 In China less than 5 % of all KFC outlets were franchised in 2005 ostensibly due to inadequate franchise 
regulations and enforcement of existing regulations. 
 
12 An obvious source of inspiration for the design of options for gradual internalisation is Williamson’s 
discussion of various hold-up safeguards (Williamson, 1985). 
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